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NAMING THE DRAGON: LITIGATING RACE ISSUES
DURING A DEATH PENALTY TRIAL
Andrea D. Lyon*
INTRODUCTION
The issue of racial disparity in the administration of the death pen-
alty is a persistent theme in modern capital jurisprudence. Starting
with Furman v. Georgia' and continuing on to McCleskey v. Zant,2
courts have struggled to come to grips with this issue. This Article will
not attempt to explore all of the legal ramifications of race and the
death penalty, nor will it speak to its political import. Rather, it will
attempt to tackle some of the practical problems facing a capital de-
fense attorney in the courtroom by providing a brief overview of mo-
tions practice in this arena using a federal capital case that the author
recently tried as an example. The Article will focus on two important
areas of trial-voir dire and development of the theory of the case.
II. MOTIONS PRACTICE
There are many "global" approaches to race and the death penalty
that one can litigate, primarily pretrial. For example, in the case of
* Andrea D. Lyon is an Associate Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the Center for
Justice in Capital Cases at DePaul University College of Law. Professor Lyon graduated from
Rutgers University in 1973, and from the Antioch School of Law in 1976. She joined the Cook
County Office of the Public Defender that year, where she worked in the felony trial division,
post-conviction/habeas corpus unit, preliminary hearing/first municipal (misdemeanor) unit, and
the appeals division. Her last position there was as Chief of the Homicide Task Force, a twenty-
two-lawyer unit representing persons accused of homicides. She has tried over 130 homicide
cases, both while in the Public Defender's office and since. She has defended over thirty poten-
tial capital cases at the trial level and has taken nineteen through the penalty phase; she has won
all nineteen. In 1990, she founded the Illinois Capital Resource Center and served as its director
until joining the University of Michigan Law School faculty as an Assistant Clinical Professor in
1995. A winner of the prestigious National Legal Aid and Defender Association's Reginald
Heber Smith Award for best advocate for the poor in the country, she is a nationally recognized
expert in the field of death penalty defense and a frequent continuing legal education teacher
throughout the country. In 2003, she was awarded the lifetime achievement award by the Illinois
Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys for her work in "honor and recognition of [her]
steadfast commitment to the indigent accused and dedicated service to the death penalty defense
community."
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2. 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
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United States v. John Bass,3 the question of racial discrimination in the
application of the federal death penalty was raised in a pretrial motion
to strike the notice of intent to seek the death penalty and included a
request for discovery from the federal government. When a claim of
selective prosecution-or in this context, selective selection for capital
prosecution-is made, getting discovery is necessary to analyze
whether or not the disparity noted can be explained by a race-neutral
factor. The question is, what do you need to show in order to get the
right to look at information that is normally not accessible to anyone
outside the prosecutorial agency?
In Bass, the motion to strike the death penalty notice was premised
on the fact that in the years from January 1995 through August 1998
(the three years prior to the filing of the motion), 57% of the defend-
ants for whom Attorney General Janet Reno had authorized the
death penalty were black.4 African Americans were (and remain)
vastly over-represented among federal capital defendants, regardless
of whether the baseline for comparison is the proportion of African
Americans in the population of the United States (13%)5 or the racial
composition of defendants in federal prosecutions. African Ameri-
cans represent 38% of the prisoners in federal prisons, 6 33% of the
defendants convicted in federal courts of violent offenses, 38% of the
defendants convicted of drug offenses, 7 and 27% of the offenders sen-
tenced under the U.S. Sentencing Commission Guidelines. 8 Indeed, a
former member of the Capital Review Committee (and distinguished
panelist at the Race to Execution Symposium), Professor Rory Little,
states that "statistical race disparity persists in federal death penalty
prosecutions .... [T]he bare statistics are disturbing. Far more black
than white defendants are being submitted for DOJ capital case re-
view and are being authorized for capital prosecution."9
3. 266 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 2001).
4. Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the Depart-
ment of Justice's Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 479 (1999) (Court-ordered discovery revealed
that, "of 296 defendants submitted for capital case review between January 27, 1995 and August
10, 1998, 55% were African-American and 80% were non-white.... [Almong the eighty-one
defendants actually authorized for death penalty prosecution: 57% were African-American and
72% were non-white.") (citations omitted).
5. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNITED STATES: 1998, at
tbl. 18, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/3/98pubs/98stats/sasec1.pdf (last visited Jan. 21,
2004).
6. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE STATISTICS-1997, at tbl. 6.43, available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/
t643.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2004).
7. Id. at tbl. 5.17.
8. Id. at tbl. 5.28.
9. Little, supra note 4, at 478.
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In a civil context, statistics like these would undoubtedly create the
prima facie case necessary to get discovery in a race discrimination
case. 10 In the selective prosecution context, however, the burden is
substantially higher-in fact, nearly impossibly high. In the older case
of Wayte v. United States,1 the United States Supreme Court held that
"[i]t is appropriate to judge selective prosecution claims according to
ordinary equal protection standards, ' 12 and it was Mr. Bass's position
that the same standard applied to his claim. However, the legal stan-
dard changed in 1996, and so, to succeed on his claim, Mr. Bass had to
show that the federal prosecutorial policy had both a discriminatory
effect and a discriminatory intent before Mr. Bass could even obtain
discovery. 13 If this standard is as high as the prosecution maintained,
it would seem that if a defendant was in a position to show both ele-
ments-discriminatory effect and intent-that he would not need to
go further. Discovery would be unnecessary. If the standard is not
that high-if Mr. Bass need only show both discriminatory effect and
the inference of discriminatory intent-then Mr. Bass should be able
to get discovery.
The district court held that Mr. Bass had done enough to warrant
discovery because of the combination of statistics and then-Attorney
General Reno's expressions of concern at a press conference during
which she discussed the racial disparity that the Department of Jus-
tice's study revealed. Attorney General Reno said that she was
"troubled" by the study and that "an even broader analysis must be
undertaken to determine if bias does, in fact, play any role in the fed-
eral death penalty system."'1 4 She called for studies by experts outside
the Department.15 Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder agreed with
her concern, stating: "[N]o one reading this report can help but be
disturbed, troubled by this disparity. We have to be honest with our-
selves. Ours is still a race-conscious society, and yet people are afraid
to talk about race." 16
10. See generally Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
see also David Crump, Evidence, Race, Intent and Evil: The Paradox of Purposelessness in the
Constitutional Race Discrimination Cases, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 285 (1998); John H. Blume et al.,
Post-McCleskey Racial Discrimination Claims in Capital Cases, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1771
(1998).
11. 470 U.S. 598 (1984).
12. Id. at 608 (footnote omitted).
13. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
14. United States v. Bass, 266 F.3d 532, 535 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Press Conference with
Attorney General Janet Reno and Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder (Sept. 12, 2000) (tran-
script on file with author)).
15. Id.
16. Id.
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After the district court ordered the Government to turn over dis-
covery, 17 the Government informed the court that it would not com-
ply with that order, so the court dismissed the death penalty notice as
a discovery sanction. 18 A divided panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's discovery
order and remanded the case to the district court for further proceed-
ings on issues of privilege, relevance, and undue burden that could not
be addressed, either by the district court or on appeal, because the
Government had refused to produce any documents, in camera or oth-
erwise, for the trial judge's consideration.19
In a per curiam opinion, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed. The Court stated:
In United States v. Armstrong, we held that a defendant who seeks
discovery on a claim of selective prosecution must show some evi-
dence of both discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent. We
need go no further in the present case than consideration of the
evidence supporting discriminatory effect. As to that, Armstrong
says that the defendant must make a "credible showing" that "simi-
larly situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted."
The Sixth Circuit concluded that respondent had made such a show-
ing based on nationwide statistics demonstrating that "[tihe United
States charges blacks with a death-eligible offense more than twice
as often as it charges whites" and that the United States enters into
plea bargains more frequently with whites than it does with blacks.
Even assuming that the Armstrong requirement can be satisfied by
a nationwide showing (as opposed to a showing regarding the re-
cord of the decisionmakers in respondent's case), raw statistics re-
garding overall charges say nothing about charges brought against
similarly situated defendants. And the statistics regarding plea bar-
gains are even less relevant, since respondent was offered a plea
bargain but declined it. Under Armstrong, therefore, because re-
spondent failed to submit relevant evidence that similarly situated
persons were treated differently, he was not entitled to discovery.
17. The order told the government to turn over a complete list of all cases since 1995 in which
the federal government has charged crimes under the Anti-Drug Abuse Statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848
(2000), including: (a) a breakdown by state, district, and office; (b) a list of the race, religion, and
ethnic background of each charged defendant; (c) the name of each United States Attorney who
handled each of these aforementioned cases; (d) a list of which of these aforementioned cases
were recommended to the Attorney General as a death penalty case; (e) the race, religion, and
ethnic background of each defendant whose case was recommended to the Attorney General as
being a death penalty case; (f) a complete list of which of these were authorized as death penalty
cases by the Attorney General's office; (g) a complete list of each of the defendants who entered
into plea bargains, were found guilty and either sentenced to death or sentenced to less, or were
acquitted; and (h) a complete list of the race, religion, and ethnic background of each defendant.
United States v. Bass, No. 97-80235 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 2000) (order granting discovery of informa-
tion pertaining to the government's capital charging practices).
18. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(1).
19. Bass, 266 F.3d 532.
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The Sixth Circuit's decision is contrary to Armstrong and threatens
the "performance of a core executive constitutional function." For
that reason, we reverse. 20
If there was any question after Armstrong about what it takes to get
discovery in order to mount a selective capital prosecution claim, Bass
laid it to rest. Unless one can show that a white capital defendant's
case looks exactly like a black capital defendant's case, but the white
defendant is not facing capital prosecution, one cannot get discov-
ery. 21 Without discovery, it is impossible to meet the burden neces-
sary to show there is no racially neutral way to explain the disparity
and prevail. In other words, you cannot get there from here.
Although the Supreme Court has created a veritable catch-22 for
selective prosecution claims, that should not discourage the filing and
litigating of this and other motions. A capital defender should file any
motion for which there is a good faith basis. This should be done be-
cause it is the right thing to do for the client, because it might just
work, and very importantly, because it may lay the groundwork for a
successful appeal. Failure to object to improper evidence, procedure,
or other trial issues almost certainly waives the issue for appellate re-
view. 22 Worse yet, if it is not objected to in the correct way in state
court, it is almost certainly insulated from federal review. 23
This is especially true in a capital case because there is no way to
anticipate what motion or objection that courts have thus far deemed
as losing may ultimately lay the groundwork for a successful attack in
the future. For example, for many years, lawyers representing capital
defendants in Illinois filed motions asking for the right to "reverse-
Witherspoon"24 capital juries. These lawyers figured that if the prose-
20. United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862, 862-63 (2002).
21. Reading the Supreme Court's opinion in Bass, one would never get the idea that there was
a substantial jurisdictional question before the Court, as presented in Mr. Bass's Brief in Opposi-
tion to a Grant of Certiorari. To quote from the brief: "The law is clear that 'the Government
[may] not take an appeal in a criminal case without express statutory authority."' Brief in Oppo-
sition to Petition for Certiorari at 5, United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862 (2002) (No. 01-1471)
(quoting United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 336 (1974) (citing United States v. Sanges, 144
U.S. 310 (1892)). In this case, the Government purported to rely on 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (2000).
But § 3731 nowhere authorizes the Government to appeal the sort of district court order at issue
here, which was an order dismissing the Government's notice of intent to seek the death penalty,
and not-as specified by the explicit text of the statute defining what orders are appealable-an
order "dismissing an indictment or information ... as to any one or more counts." In the ab-
sence of authority to appeal, this Court has no jurisdiction to consider the case on certiorari
because this is not a case "'in the court[ ] of appeals"' as required by 28 U.S.C. §1254 (2000).
Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari at 5, Bass (No. 01-1471). The Supreme Court did
not even mention the issue.
22. See Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992).
23. Id.
24. See Witherspoon, v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1986).
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cution had the right to find out who would never be able to impose
the death penalty,2 5 lawyers for the defense should be able to find out
who would never consider anything other than death. These motions
were denied time and again. The denial of these motions was affirmed
time and again. 26 Then the Supreme Court decided Morgan v. Illinois
27 and agreed that defense lawyers should be allowed to "reverse-
Witherspoon" capital juries. If the trial lawyers in Morgan had not
made the record, and had not been willing to hear the words "denied"
one more time, this right would not exist.
III. JURY SELECTION 28
Jury selection is actually a process of elimination; potential jurors
are called for jury duty, during which they are questioned and either
seated, excused for cause, or excused by a peremptory challenge by
either side. Generally, a challenge for cause involves a juror who has
a relationship with a party or witness, has some personal experience
that would cause him or her to be unfair, or is legally unable to sit. In
capital cases, the group of potential jurors excludable for cause is
much larger because anyone who is against the death penalty can be
so excused.
Under Witherspoon v. Illinois,29 the State has the right to exclude,
for cause, anyone who could not consider giving the death penalty.
Adams v. Texas, 30 as interpreted in Wainwright v. Witt,3t modified the
"automatic" and "unmistakably clear" language of Witherspoon's
footnotes nine and twenty-one, which allowed the exclusion for cause
only when jurors unqualifiedly expressed their unwillingness to con-
sider the death penalty. 32 While this relaxed somewhat the rigors of
inquiry on one side of the question, in the long run it complicates
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., People v. Brisbon, 478 N.E.2d 402 (Il1. 1985); People v. Caballero, 464 N.E.2d 223
(Ill. 1984); People v. Ramirez, 457 N.E.2d 31 (Il. 1983); People v. Jackson, 582 N.E.2d 125 (I1.
1991).
27. 504 U.S. 719 (1968).
28. Some of the introductory material for this section of this Article has been adapted from
the jury selection chapter in STEPHEN L. RICHARDS ET AL., ILLINOIS DEATH PENALTY DEFENSE
LAW AND PRACTICE MANUAL (2003), published by the Office of the State Appellate Defender
of Illinois and the Center for Justice in Capital Cases at the DePaul University College of Law.
29. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
30. 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
31. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
32. Compare Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520, with Adams, 448 U.S. at 45 ("prevent or substan-
tially impair the performance of his duties as a juror... ") (emphasis added), and Witt, 469 U.S.
at 424 ("standard is whether the jurors' views would 'prevent or substantially impair the perform-
ance of his duties as a juror ... "') (emphasis added).
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matters. This is because "death-qualification" now becomes a three-
dimensional phenomenon for the interrogator.
First, jurors who are "substantially impaired" by virtue of anti-capi-
tal punishment views must be identified. Second, jurors who are "sub-
stantially impaired" by virtue of pro-capital punishment views must be
identified. 33 In Morgan v. Illinois,34 the Supreme Court held that the
venire must be questioned regarding pro-capital punishment, poten-
tially disqualifying views-primarily the inability to truly consider mit-
igating evidence and vote for a sentence other than death, assuming a
conviction for first degree murder. If potential jurors cannot consider
mitigating evidence, they must be excused. 35 Third, venire members
who are substantially impaired must be identified in considering law-
ful mitigating evidence.36 Inquiry into a prospective juror's thoughts
and feelings on the death penalty is a far more complex process than
simply whether that juror is "for or against" capital punishment. It is
imperative to discover if the juror is generally favorable to or against
the concept, and whether he or she can listen to both aggravating and
mitigating evidence, and actually consider each.
Racial prejudice inherent in capital jury sentencing was considered
in McCleskey v. Kemp.37 The United States Supreme Court acknowl-
edged in McCleskey that the statistical evidence "indicates a discrep-
ancy that appears to correlate with race."' 38 Refusing to overturn an
entire capital sentencing system due to this improper influence, the
Court attempted to tackle the problem in other, less "radical" ways.
One of those ways is requiring special procedures in jury selection:
Because of the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in capital sen-
tencing hearings, there is a unique opportunity for racial prejudice
to operate but remain undetected. On the facts of this case, a juror
who believes that blacks are violence-prone or morally inferior
might well be influenced by that belief in deciding whether peti-
tioner's crime involved the aggravating factors specified under Vir-
ginia law. Such a juror might be less favorably inclined towards
33. Antideath penalty venire members may be referred to as "Witherspoon-Witt excludables,"
or "WEs." See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 167 n.1 (1986).
34. 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
35. Indeed, in his dissent in Morgan, Justice Antonin Scalia complains, "Presumably, under
today's decision a juror who thinks a 'bad childhood' is never mitigating must also be excluded."
Id. at 745 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
36. Sometimes phrased in now-outdated Witherspoon terms, courts refer to such jurors as
having "automatic death penalty" views. This means they are jurors biased in favor of the death
penalty under all circumstances after a conviction for murder. After Witt, "automatic" is not the
applicable standard. Nevertheless, these potential jurors are often referred to as "automatic
death penalty jurors" or "ADPs."
37. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
38. Id. at 312.
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petitioner's evidence of mental disturbance as a mitigating circum-
stance. More subtle, less consciously held racial attitudes could also
influence a juror's decision in this case. Fear of blacks, which could
easily be stirred up by the violent facts of petitioner's crime, might
incline a juror to favor the death penalty.39
The issue of racial discrimination in the selection of juries and the
venire from which they are chosen has been difficult for the courts to
grapple with. The Equal Protection Clause40 forbids the prosecutor
from challenging prospective jurors solely on the basis of race or on
the assumption that members of the defendant's race will be unable to
be impartial jurors.
Until 1986, a defendant who wanted to challenge racial discrimina-
tion in jury selection had to meet the Swain v. Alabama4' standard.
This required a defendant to prove purposeful discrimination through-
out the prosecutorial arena (i.e., the state). 42 This burden proved too
much for an individual defendant to bear, both in terms of scope and
resources, so in Batson v. Kentucky,43 the Supreme Court changed the
manner by which a defendant might challenge racial discrimination by
the prosecution in jury selection. There are two kinds of challenges to
potential jurors that an attorney can make: challenges for cause and
peremptory challenges.44 Challenges for cause can be made by either
party or sua sponte by the trial judge when it becomes apparent that
the particular potential juror cannot be fair to one side or the other, or
has some other impediment to serving as a juror.4 5 Peremptory chal-
lenges are limited in number and can be made by either side, for any
or no reason, are given to each side by rule or statute, and are limited
in number.46 Defense attorneys, for years, had been challenging what
they perceived to be racially discriminatory uses of peremptory chal-
lenges that excluded all or most minority jurors. The Batson Court
held that when the defense believed that this was occurring, an objec-
tion could be made to the trial judge, and if the trial judge found that
a prima facie case had been made, the prosecution would have to give
"race-neutral" reasons for the exclusions. If the trial court accepted
these explanations, the trial would continue. If not, a mistrial would
be declared. 47 This procedure was supposed to fix the problem.
39. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
41. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
42. Id. at 227.
43. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
44. THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 37-39 (6th ed. 2002).
45. Id. at 37-38.
46. Id. at 38.
47. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
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It has not, however, exactly had that effect. Once defense counsel
has made the objection and established a prima facie showing,
prosecutorial tendering and judicial acceptance of "racially neutral"
explanations that have proven acceptable to reviewing courts has be-
come nearly pro forma. For example, in People v. Randall,48 before
reversing the case and remanding for a Batson violation, the court
observed:
Having made these observations [about the function of a Batson
challenge], we now consider the charade that has become the Bat-
son process. The State may provide the trial court with a series of
pat race-neutral reasons for exercise of peremptory challenges.
Since reviewing courts examine only the record, we wonder if the
reasons can be given without a smile. Surely, new prosecutors are
given a manual, probably entitled, "Handy Race-Neutral Explana-
tions" or "20 Time-Tested Race-Neutral Explanations." It might in-
clude: too old, too young, divorced, long, unkempt hair, free-lance
writer, religion, social worker, renter, lack of family contact, at-
tempting to make eye-contact with defendant, "lived in an area con-
sisting predominantly of apartment complexes," single, over-
educated, lack of maturity, improper demeanor, unemployed, im-
proper attire, juror lived alone, misspelled place of employment, liv-
ing with girlfriend, unemployed spouse, spouse employed as school
teacher, employment as part-time barber, friendship with city coun-
cil member, failure to remove hat, lack of community ties, children
same "age bracket" as defendant, deceased father and prospective
juror's aunt receiving psychiatric care.
Recent consideration of the Batson issue makes us wonder if the
rule would be imposed only where the prosecutor states that he
does not care to have an African-American on the jury. We are re-
minded of the musing of Justice Cardozo, "We are not to close our
eyes as judges to what we must perceive as men."'49
Of course, Batson is only relevant to the issue of exclusion of identi-
fiable groups from jury service. It has nothing to do with the far more
pervasive and dangerous issue of racial bias among jurors. It is those
attitudes that the capital defender must explore and expose. This re-
quires some skills that are not necessarily comfortable for many (if not
most) attorneys.
"Jury selection has three main goals: (1) to elicit information from
jurors; (2) to educate jurors on the defense case while defusing the
prosecutor's case; and (3) to establish a relationship between the ju-
48. 671 N.E.2d 60 (I11. App. Ct. 1996).
49. Id. at 65-66 (footnotes omitted).
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rors and the defense attorney and his or her client. ' 50 Probably the
single most important thing a lawyer can do in furtherance of these
goals is to listen. Some psychologists refer to this skill as attending
behavior; it includes a relaxed attentive posture, eye contact, and ver-
bal following.51
In the Bass case, which was ultimately tried (and resulted in a life
verdict), the prospective jurors completed a nineteen-page jury ques-
tionnaire prior to their in-court voir dire. In one juror's questionnaire,
racial bias seemed to "peek out." By listening carefully and giving the
juror the opportunity to recognize her own stereotypes, counsel was
successful in getting her to "take herself off the jury." The following
colloquy took place after the court had questioned the juror about her
availability, and the Assistant United States Attorney had asked her
about various legal concepts:
MS. LYON: Good morning, Mrs. Smith. How are you?
JUROR SMITH 52: Fine, thank you. How are you?
MS. LYON: A little nervous too.
JUROR SMITH: Yeah.
MS. LYON: I have a few questions to ask you, but before I do I
just want you to know that none of us-this isn't a test, you know,
and there's no right answer. Whatever you feel is what you feel.
And you should feel comfortable about telling us that. That is all
anybody, the Judge, the prosecution and the Defense wants to
know. Okay?
JUROR SMITH: Uh-hmm.
MS. LYON: All right. I wanted to talk with you about one of the
answers that you gave in your questionnaire when you were asked if
there's any other information we should know about. And you said
that many of your family members are quite prejudiced against
black people, possibly because the workers in or with-and then I
couldn't read the last little part of it. But maybe you can just tell me
what you were thinking about there.
JUROR SMITH: Well, my husband-I did not know him then,
but he was a Pontiac policeman during the riots. I think it was in
'67. And that was mostly black against white at that time. And, you
know, he has relayed things about what happened during that time.
My father-in-law, he is deceased now, but he was a Bloomfield
Township police officer. And in the line of duty he killed a black
man and used to brag about it, and very prejudiced towards black
50. Cathy E. Bennett et al., How To Conduct a Meaningful and Effective Voir Dire in Criminal
Cases, in MICHIGAN CLINICAL LAW PROGRAM, CRIMINAL CONCENTRATION HANDBOOK SUPPLE-
MENT 50 (Andrea D. Lyon ed., 2d ed. 1999).
51. ALLEN E. IvEY, MICROCOUNSELING: INNOVATIONS IN INTERVIEW TRAINING 30 (1971).
52. The juror's name has been changed to protect her privacy.
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people. And I heard this quite often. My husband relays this quite
often.
My daughter works for the Auburn Hills Police Department.
She, you know, grew up disliking black people from what she has
heard. And just-the whole family just thinks like this.
Now, I really can't say that I am prejudiced, but I've heard this.
And so there's a lot of disliking of black people in my family.
MS. LYON: I'm not sure if I'm hearing you properly. So, I'm
going to follow up a little bit with that and just ask you. It sounds to
me like you are both worried that you have been affected by this
yourself.
JUROR SMITH: Yes.
MS. LYON: And a little bit ashamed about that.
JUROR SMITH: Yes.
MS. LYON: Is that right?
JUROR SMITH: Yes.
MS. LYON: I wanted to make sure I was hearing you.
Obviously, you know I'm sitting next to Mr. Bass here who is an
African-American man.
What do you think I should do here?
JUROR SMITH: What do I think-
MS. LYON: Let me ask you the question in a different way. I'm
sorry. I know it's very uncomfortable. I'm really not trying to make
you uncomfortable. I'm sorry.
You were saying earlier that sometimes your daughter expresses
what I guess I could fairly say are kind of racist attitudes. Would
that be fair?
JUROR SMITH: Very fair, yes.
MS. LYON: What do you say to her when she does that?
JUROR SMITH: I basically just listen. I didn't write it on the
form, but my granddaughter, she's 16, and she's-has some girl-
friends and they are starting to date and she is dating a black guy,
and my daughter is totally furious about that. I just sort of listen. I
don't really say a whole lot about it. That's something I guess that
she will have to deal with.
MS. LYON: How do you feel about your granddaughter's
boyfriend?
JUROR SMITH: Well, I've never met him. But I just basically
grew up that you date within your race.
MS. LYON: So, would it be fair to say that this bothers you?
JUROR SMITH: Yes, it does.
MS. LYON: Would you feel-I'm trying to figure out how to ask
this question without being rude. So you have to forgive me here.
But would you think that this might not be the best case for you to
be a juror on because of some of the things we're talking about right
now?
JUROR SMITH: Yeah. I think that would be a true statement,
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THE COURT: Any objection? 53
MR. LEIBSON (Assistant Unites States Attorney): No.
THE COURT: Thank you for answering honestly and bringing it
to our attention. Please take this form to the fifth floor. And they
will tell you what the next step is, which is probably to go home with
thanks. Thank you very much.54
As is apparent from the excerpt, litigating race in the courtroom is not
always about pounding the table or making a scene-sometimes it is
about making the space for honest and equitable responses.
IV. DEVELOPING THE THEORY OF THE CASE WHEN RACE IS A
SALIENT FACTOR AT TRIAL
Theory of the case is not what one might think at first-at least not
in a trial court. It is not the legal theory (although that might be part
of it). The theory of the case must encompass the facts, favorable and
unfavorable, and it must answer the central question the jury has.55
For example, if the defense is "mistaken identity," why was a mistake
made? Was it poor opportunity to observe? A weakness in the ob-
server? Bias? Finding out the answer to the central question of the
case informs the direction that both investigation and motions practice
will take.
Assume for a moment that a defendant is charged with double
homicide-murder in the first degree. In most states, a multiple first
degree murder will qualify, or make eligible, a defendant for the death
penalty. 56 A thorough reading of the police reports, the defendant's
statement, and the beginning investigation reveal that the defendant
had been threatened by one of the two deceased men on numerous
occasions, had been attacked by that same person twice-once shot at
but not injured-and that the two deceased individuals invited the de-
fendant to go outside of the bar he was in the night of the incident.
The defendant shot and killed both men almost immediately upon get-
ting outside the bar. In his statement to the police, the defendant said
he was afraid of them. When asked, if that was the case, why did he
follow them out of the bar, he only said, "I had to."
Now the legal defense is obvious-self-defense. But in developing
the theory of the case, the problem is the fact that the defendant fol-
53. At this point, Judge Arthur J. Tarnow was directing his question to the prosecution table
to see if it had any objection for an excusal for cause.
54. Transcript of Trial vol. 3 at 18-22, United States v. Bass, 266 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 2001) (No.
97-CR-80235-01).
55. See, e.g., MAUET, supra note 44, at 23-28.
56. For example, in Illinois, a multiple murder is one of twenty aggravating factors that would
allow the prosecution to seek the death penalty. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(b)(3) (2002).
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lowed the man he was afraid of and his companion outside. Just say-
ing the words "self-defense" will not suffice. Instead, defense counsel
needs to figure out what "I had to" meant. Was the defendant afraid
for his family? Had he been told that there was a "hit" out for him?
Did one of the deceased say to him before walking out that they were
coming back in with deadly weapons? These are some examples of
what might answer that question and allow the defense to credibly put
forward a self-defense presentation.
Suppose, however, that the "answer" to the question of why the
defendant followed the two men out of the bar is that he had been
afraid for so long he just had to end it before they got him. A jury
might reject that explanation and convict the defendant but spare his
life. That is because the theory of mitigation should enfold the
(failed) defense and tell the story of the defendant's life, and hope-
fully walk the jury through the defendant's environment so that, while
the jury may not forgive the crime, they can see a reason to spare him.
In order to present an effective theory of mitigation-reasons to
punish with less than death-defense counsel must perform a rigorous
examination of the client's life and other relevant circumstances. It is
beyond the scope of this Article to examine these concepts in detail,
but suffice it to say the theory of the case must dovetail, or at least not
fight with, the theory of mitigation. 57 One cannot say first that the
prosecution has the wrong man, then turn around in the sentencing
phase and say this "wrong man" is sorry for what he has done.
With these considerations as a backdrop, how does one "litigate"
race at trial? At a capital sentencing hearing? It differs depending on
whether racial issues are salient or not salient.
If race is a salient part of the case, it should be addressed directly by
the capital defense attorney. Race may be salient because of the race
of the witnesses, victims, their families, or all three, and the defendant.
It may be salient because there is a direct racial element to the of-
fense-a hate crime for example, or a clash between gangs of different
races. Race may also be more obviously salient-the crime may have
been committed by or against a white supremacist, or by or against a
black nationalist. For example, there is no question that a minority
defendant charged with the murder of a white victim or victims is fac-
ing a tough situation.58 Telling a jury that this "should not matter"
may be a nice sentiment, but it ignores reality. In today's society, it is
unlikely that a juror (or a jury) will consciously treat the minority de-
57. See Andrea D. Lyon, Defending the Death Penalty Case: What Makes Death Different?, 42
MERCER L. REV. 695 (1991).
58. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
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fendant worse because he is black, Hispanic, or another minority. But
studies tell us that his life may be viewed as less valuable to many, if
not most, jurors.59
When race is a salient part of the case, direct comment through
cross-examination, direct examination, or in opening or closing state-
ments is warranted-not politically correct rhetoric, but an honest un-
veiling of the obvious. Some of the same techniques discussed in the
context of voir dire apply here: self-disclosure, not judging the feelings
the jurors might have, and helping jurors to get to the place at which
they can understand and adjust for what they feel.
V. DEVELOPING THE THEORY OF THE CASE WHEN RACE IS
NOT SALIENT
In cases in which race is not salient, race may still remain a factor.
For example, if both the victim and the defendant are black, prejudice
is still a concern. At the Race to Execution Symposium, Dr. Craig
Haney spoke of the "empathic divide" in our society.60 This divide
means it is difficult to communicate in any viscerally impactful way to
jurors whose lives are usually so different than that of the capital de-
fendant. For example, let us return to the self-defense example above.
Suppose the deceased individuals and the defendant are all members
of the same minority group. And assume further that the reason the
defendant was armed was because of the dangerousness of the neigh-
borhood in which he lived. Telling the jury that the neighborhood was
dangerous only distances them further from the defendant. Showing
them, however, is a different matter.
In another case, the author wished to communicate how dangerous
her client's neighborhood was, in order to truly explain the fact that
her client had been armed. Enlisting the help of an undergraduate
film student, a video camera was set up in that neighborhood on a
bright, sunny day and run all day. At first, people in the neighbor-
hood played to the camera, but, after a while, they paid no attention
to it. The student then edited it down to a manageable length. It was
positively terrifying. On this beautiful day, with a nice breeze in the
air, there were drug deals, fights, and one group of young people chas-
ing an obviously terrified teenager home-it said everything that
59. See, for example, David Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the
Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1661 (1998), which found evidence of race-of-victim disparities in 90%
of states studied and race-of-defendant disparities in 55%.
60. See Craig Haney, Commonsense Justice and Capital Punishment: Problematizing the Will
of the People, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 303 (1997).
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words could and much more. It is certainly possible that a trial judge
might keep this kind of evidence out of a trial, but not at a sentencing
hearing with its relaxed standards for admissibility. 61
Again, it is important not to shy away from speaking directly to the
issue-and to do so by connecting those things that are usual to hu-
mankind: love, hope, joy, loss, grief, and despair. They might come in
different forms on "different sides of the track," but they come
nevertheless. 62
VI. SPEAKING UP
There are many times when confronting racial attitudes is necessary
in the courtroom. The problem with doing it is not just the how to, or
the when to, or even the why-it is fear. When a lawyer speaks up
about these issues, he or she is inviting anger from the prosecution,
and potentially the judge. The jury may resent the lawyer raising the
issue-jurors may be hostile and see the capital defender as "playing
the race card."
That fear, however, does not relieve the capital defender of the duty
to speak up. How to, when to, and to whom to speak-well, that is
what the lawyer must decide. But remaining silent is not an option.
Silence in these circumstances may very well cost your client his life.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is a myth about dragons; the way one gets power over a
dragon, it is told, is through knowledge and use of the dragon's true
name.
The courtroom is no different-it is, at times, a fire-breathing lethal
enemy. Facing the racial issues in your case-salient or not-will re-
veal that dragon's true name and allow the defense team to conquer
this seemingly indomitable foe.
61. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
62. For a fascinating look at how jurors' racial attitudes affect the narrative they both hear and
tell about a capital trial, see Benjamin Fleury-Steiner, Narratives of the Death Sentence: Toward a
Theory of Legal Narrativity, 36 LAW & Soc'y REV. 549 (2002).
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